Illegal Betting and Money Laundering Allegations at Ozan Elektronik Para

A comprehensive financial crime investigation launched by the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office revealed that hundreds of millions of Turkish Liras in illegal earnings from online betting and unauthorized gambling were laundered through financial institutions like Ozan Elektronik Para Inc. It is alleged that the company did not prevent recurring high-value transactions from cards originating in high-risk countries like Libya and Iraq, using this method to inject illegal betting proceeds into the financial system via “POS loan sharking” . Ten people were detained as part of the operation, the company’s assets worth 402 million TL were seized, and a court appointed the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) as the trustee.

The Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office has carried out a critical operation, signaling a new era in the fight against financial crime. The investigation, focusing on charges of “illegal betting,” “loan sharking,” and “laundering assets derived from crime,” targeted Ozan Elektronik Para Inc., a prominent entity in the fintech sector.

Prosecutors determined that the company’s electronic money license was allegedly used to funnel proceeds earned through violations of Law No. 7258 on Football and Other Sports Betting and Gambling (illegal betting activities) into the legitimate financial system. This development clearly demonstrates that illegal betting networks are no longer confined to the underground economy but are actively exploiting digital finance platforms and payment infrastructures.

The Veil of Illegal Betting: POS Loan Sharking and Suspicious Cards

The most alarming part of the investigation involves the findings that point to Ozan Elektronik Para Inc.’s role in funneling illegal betting earnings into the financial system. According to the investigation file, which combines reports from MASAK (Financial Crimes Investigation Board), the Central Bank, and independent auditors, the company may have knowingly or negligently facilitated the flow of dirty money.

The Route for Laundering Criminal Proceeds:

• High-Risk Sources: The file indicates the presence of intense and suspicious transaction patterns involving bank cards from countries designated as high-risk by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), such as Libya and Iraq.
• Failure to Heed Alerts: High-value payments that recurred frequently over short periods—deviating from normal commercial activity—were not stopped, despite system warnings being generated. It is alleged that the necessary precautionary measures were not taken.
• POS Loan Sharking (Tefecilik): The investigation revealed that the same cards were used frequently at various merchant locations to create the illusion of genuine commercial activity. Authorities conclude this was, in fact, a money laundering model designed to inject betting profits into the system.
• Rapid Cash Flow: This mechanism allowed proceeds from unauthorized betting activities to be channeled through bogus or pretextual commercial transactions and incorporated into the electronic money infrastructure, thus acquiring the appearance of legitimate funding.

These findings suggest that illegal betting rings are increasingly abandoning cash and conventional methods, preferring the faster, less-regulated payment channels offered by electronic money institutions to launder their earnings. Further technical evidence and transaction examples are expected to be made public as the investigation proceeds.

402 Million TL in Assets Seized and Trustee Appointed

Financial reviews conducted during the investigation identified millions of liras in transactions believed to be connected to illegal betting proceeds within Ozan Elektronik Para Inc. Following the MASAK report, a court ordered the seizure of all assets suspected of being related to money laundering.

Calculations show that a total of 402 million TL worth of assets, including 7 companies, 3 residences, 5 plots of land, and 4 vehicles directly or indirectly controlled by the company, were placed under injunction. This measure aims both to freeze the trail of criminal proceeds and prevent the potential destruction of evidence.

The Istanbul Criminal Judgeship of Peace placed the company under the management of the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF). With the TMSF appointed as the trustee, the company’s accounts, contracts, and transaction records have come under full judicial supervision.

The prosecution has initiated a detailed financial analysis to determine whether the seized assets were derived specifically from illegal betting activities. Furthermore, examinations of the company’s foreign-linked partnerships and money transfers continue. Experts view this development as a significant precedent for the supervision of the fintech sector in Turkey. The trusteeship serves not only to seize criminal proceeds but also as a preventive mechanism against the misuse of financial technologies.

The Camouflage of Criminal Proceeds: The Insurance Premium Facade

New findings revealed by the investigation indicate that the money laundering chain for illegal betting proceeds was not limited to Ozan Elektronik Para Inc. The Prosecutor’s Office also brought Aveon Global Sigorta A.Ş. (Aveon Global Insurance Inc.), a company co-owned by Ozan Elektronik Para founder Ozan Özerk, under scrutiny.

Financial analysis suggests that proceeds from illegal betting and loan sharking were funneled into the system via Ozan Elektronik Para Inc. and then circulated through Aveon Global Insurance, often disguised as insurance premiums or commercial payments. This process aimed to lend the appearance of legitimate cash flow to crime-derived funds through insurance policies and financial transactions.

Authorities suggest this method resembles the classic “layering” tactic used to obscure the source of dirty money. It is believed that no genuine insurance services were provided; the transactions were merely a façade to mask the origin of the funds.

The investigation file also contained evidence linking Aveon Global Insurance to Aveon Global Holding, which is controlled through London. This connection strengthens the possibility that the money laundering operations were conducted through an international network.

Prosecutorial sources emphasize the risk posed by the use of financial institutions for the transfer of such criminal proceeds, pointing out a significant vulnerability in the financial oversight system when legally operating insurance and electronic money firms are misused in this manner.

International Connections and the Jeton Allegation

Another compelling aspect of the investigation stretches back to the international financial technology networks established by Ozan Elektronik Para’s founder, Ozan Özerk. Journalist Murat Ağırel, in his book Kirli Çark (The Dirty Gear), states that Özerk was at one point a partner in the international payment platform, Jeton.

Jeton was previously mentioned as one of the methods used for investments and fund transfers to some illegal betting sites operating in Turkey. This infrastructure, provided through Jeton, facilitated user access to betting sites in different countries, enabling unregulated money flows.

Although Özerk is reported to have subsequently left the partnership and the company structure has changed over time, this link provides important context to the financial network being examined in the Ozan Elektronik Para investigation.

Experts stress that such fintech ventures, particularly those involved in international money transfer systems, can be easily exploited by illegal betting and money laundering networks due to lapses in oversight. The Jeton example illustrates how global vulnerabilities in digital payment solutions can manifest in Turkey.

These allegations highlight that the Ozan Elektronik Para investigation is not merely a local financial crime case but also a reflection of gaps in the international financial oversight of complex digital transactions.

The Regulatory Wave in Fintech: Papara, PayFix, and Others Under Scrutiny

The Ozan Elektronik Para Inc. investigation has brought renewed attention to the supervision of Turkey’s rapidly growing electronic money sector. Recently, many digital payment companies, including Papara, PayFix, Parolapara, Vepara, and Sipay, have faced activity restrictions, cash flow audits, and temporary license suspensions.

Some of these companies were scrutinized by the Central Bank (TCMB) and MASAK due to lapses in their legal licensing processes, inadequate Know Your Customer (KYC) mechanisms, or high volumes of suspicious transaction reports. Experts believe that the increased volume of illegal betting traffic over the last two years has amplified the risk of electronic money institutions being used as vehicles for the transfer of criminal proceeds.

While fintech companies prioritize “fast transactions” and “instant money transfers” to grow their user base, these advantages can turn into supervisory weaknesses if criminal proceeds infiltrate the system. MASAK reports have highlighted significant gaps in the KYC processes of some institutions and delays in reporting suspicious transactions.

The Ozan Elektronik file has become one of the most visible examples of this systemic problem. Financial security specialists advocate for the view that “electronic money institutions in Turkey should be audited like actual banks, not just fintech companies.” Specifically, widely-used applications like Papara, due to their integration with international transfer systems, should be subject to stricter regulations.

This scenario indicates a new intersection between the development of financial technologies and the rise of illegal betting, money laundering, and digital crime. The outcome of this investigation may prove to be a turning point, not just for Ozan Elektronik Para, but for the entire electronic money ecosystem.